|
| A weekly newsletter zooming in on Europe through local perspectives. Every Friday, one topic explored by five independent newsrooms. | | IN THIS ISSUE | §01 · In focus — How Enlargement Is Debated in Member States and in Brussels
§02 · The local view — Berlin, Riga, Warsaw, Vienna and Zagreb
§03 · The podcast — Listen to the latest episode and join the conversation
§04 · From the newsrooms — Recent reporting from the lensEU network |
|
|
| §01 · IN FOCUS | How Enlargement Is Debated in Member States and in Brussels | After years of stagnation, EU enlargement is back at the heart of the European debate. In July alone, Ukraine and Moldova opened their first negotiating clusters, while Montenegro and Albania advanced further in their accession talks, meaning that more negotiating chapters have been opened and provisionally closed over the past six months than in the previous decade. Montenegro, now widely seen as the EU accession frontrunner, could become the European Union's next member as early as 2028. The EU has already begun drafting its Accession Treaty. | Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally transformed the enlargement debate. Once viewed primarily as an economic and political project, enlargement is now increasingly framed as a cornerstone of Europe's security architecture. Yet as political momentum builds, difficult questions are becoming harder to avoid. Is the European Union institutionally prepared for another wave of enlargement? Should it reform itself before admitting new members? Are Europeans fully aware that every delay leaves room for Russia, China and other external powers to expand their influence in the EU's neighbourhood? And with war on Europe's doorstep and the eurosceptic far right gaining ground across much of the EU, is this really the right moment to take on the challenges of integrating new members? | Until recently, the main challenge for candidate countries was meeting the Copenhagen criteria: ensuring stable democratic institutions, strengthening the rule of law, protecting human rights and minorities, building a functioning market economy, and aligning national legislation with the EU acquis. Those requirements remain unchanged. As European leaders often stress, EU accession remains a merit-based process, with no shortcuts. What has changed is the debate within the Union itself. | Rather than asking only whether candidates are ready to join, member states have increasingly begun asking whether the European Union is ready to enlarge. | At the centre of that debate lies the question of institutional reform. Many governments argue that an enlarged Union cannot function effectively under its current decision-making rules. With up to ten candidate countries waiting to join, concerns have grown that extending unanimity to an even larger group of member states could make the EU increasingly vulnerable to paralysis. Proposals under discussion therefore include expanding qualified majority voting in selected policy areas, reforming the size and composition of the European Commission, and adapting the institutions and budget to a Union of more than 30 member states.While some governments insist that at least part of these reforms should precede the next enlargement, others warn that making accession conditional on treaty change could delay the process indefinitely. | That discussion has intensified as Montenegro approaches the finish line. For the first time since Croatia joined the bloc in 2013, the EU is drafting an Accession Treaty for a new member. Rather than pursuing a far-reaching reform of the EU treaties before enlargement – a process that would require unanimous agreement and national ratifications – member states are increasingly exploring whether at least some of the necessary changes could be incorporated into future accession treaties instead. The aim is to strengthen the Union's ability to safeguard its fundamental values without postponing enlargement indefinitely. | One of the key ideas concerns stronger safeguards against democratic backsliding. The experience of Hungary and, to a lesser extent, Poland has convinced many governments that fulfilling accession criteria before joining the Union does not necessarily guarantee continued compliance afterwards. Five of the EU's six founding member states –Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg – have therefore proposed introducing stronger post-accession mechanisms that would allow the Union to react more quickly if new members undermine the rule of law or democratic standards. Their proposals include a new post-accession monitoring mechanism, a safeguard clause allowing the EU to take measures in cases of serious democratic backsliding, including in areas such as media freedom, and a discussion on temporarily limiting the voting rights of new member states in policy areas where unanimity is required, such as enlargement, foreign policy and the EU budget. | Also the European Commission is now preparing its own proposals. Among the ideas under discussion are stronger rule-of-law guarantees embedded in future accession treaties, clearer mechanisms for monitoring democratic standards after accession, and gradual integration of candidate countries into selected EU policies before they become full members. The objective is twofold: to reassure sceptical member states that enlargement will not weaken the Union, while allowing candidate countries to benefit earlier from closer integration and maintain momentum for reforms. | Not everyone is convinced. | Montenegro, despite supporting stronger safeguards in principle, has warned against creating what its representatives describe as "second-class membership". Podgorica argues that any additional conditions should be transparent, objective and agreed before accession – not introduced at the final stage of negotiations or used to permanently limit the rights of future members. | Another increasingly contentious issue is money. | The European Commission estimates that Montenegro's accession would require a financial package worth around €3.2 billion. Although that amount represents less than one euro per EU taxpayer, diplomats argue that the real significance lies elsewhere. Whatever financial model is adopted for Montenegro is likely to become the template for future enlargements – including far more politically and financially challenging cases such as Ukraine. Questions about who pays for enlargement, whether additional EU revenue will be needed, and how cohesion and agricultural funding should be redistributed are already becoming part of the negotiations over the Union's next long-term budget. | Yet perhaps the greatest obstacle does not lie in Brussels at all. | Across Europe, enlargement is increasingly filtered through national politics. While European leaders often describe it as a strategic investment in peace and security, domestic debates tend to focus on much more immediate concerns: agriculture, migration, national veto powers, historical disputes or the future distribution of EU funds. As a result, support for enlargement may remain strong in principle while becoming considerably weaker when discussions turn to specific candidate countries. | That divergence is precisely what emerges from this week's local perspectives. | Paulina Pacuła, journalist, OKO.press |
|
|
| |
| | Riga · Latvia · TVNET | The Next EU Enlargement: Latvia Sees Allies, Not Risks | Ukraine, Moldova, Albania and Montenegro are among the countries that could become members of the European Union in the foreseeable future. | But what role does the possible enlargement of the EU play for Latvia? | Riga supports the accession of these countries, provided they carry out the necessary reforms and meet the required criteria. For Latvia, EU enlargement is primarily a matter of the European security architecture. Membership for Ukraine and Moldova would strengthen not only those countries, but also Latvia and the European Union as a whole, especially given Ukraine's unique battlefield experience. | The same approach applies to the Western Balkan countries. Latvia shares with them the experience it gained during its own accession to the EU and welcomes Montenegro's progress in particular, especially its cooperation with NATO and its alignment with sanctions against Russia and Belarus. | However, parliamentary elections are approaching, and their outcome remains difficult to predict. As a result, the debate on EU enlargement may extend well beyond security issues. Voters may become increasingly interested in how enlargement could affect the EU budget, Latvia's share of EU funding, and competition in the agricultural sector. | While there are currently no recent opinion polls focusing specifically on Latvia, across the European Union as a whole, 56% of citizens support further enlargement. | In the end, EU enlargement represents both an opportunity for Latvia to expand its circle of allies and a potential source of new economic challenges. All that remains is to watch how the situation develops. | Andrejs Timofejevs, journalist, TVNET GRUPA. |
|
|
|
|
| | Warsaw · Poland · OKO.press | Poland risks becoming Ukraine’s new accession brake | Poland’s position on Ukraine’s EU membership has changed significantly since 2022. In the first months after Russia’s full-scale invasion, support for Kyiv’s European future was widespread and framed mainly as an act of solidarity and a strategic investment in regional security. However, as the accession process accelerated, the debate has shifted towards agriculture, road transport, EU funding and unresolved historical disputes. | The far right was the first to capitalise on these concerns, but Law and Justice has followed a similar path. Senior PiS politicians now argue that Poland should block further progress in accession talks until Ukraine changes its approach to the Volhynia massacres in 1943 and the legacy of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), whose members were responsible for these crimes against the local Polish population. | Donald Tusk’s government still formally supports Ukraine’s EU accession, but its rhetoric has become increasingly cautious. Ministers stress that there can be no shortcuts, that Polish interests in agriculture and transport must be protected, and that accession may take many years. They also point to historical issues – mainly the legacy of UPA and the Volhynia massacres – as serious obstacles to Ukraine’s EU membership. Some senior Civic Coalition (Koalicja Obywatelska) politicians also argue that the EU itself is not currently ready for further enlargement. Warsaw rejects alternative or accelerated membership models and promises to defend its interests as firmly as other cautious member states. | This raises an uncomfortable question: after Hungary stopped blocking Ukraine’s path, could Poland become the next brake on the accession process? For now, Warsaw supports membership in principle. In practice, domestic politics may increasingly determine how quickly Ukraine moves forward | Paulina Pacuła, journalist, OKO.press |
|
|
|
|
| | Vienna · Austria · Die Presse | Pros and Cons: On Ukraine's gradual accession | The proposal by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz (CDU) to grant Ukraine gradual accession to the EU is proving controversial. Die Presse examined both sides. | Pro: Partial EU membership reduces the risk | Full membership for Ukraine is at least ten years away. The proposal would bridge that long interval, speeding up integration in areas such as the single market. At the same time, it could reduce the risk of a large country helping to shape common policy—and gaining influence over the shared budget—too quickly, before it has implemented adequate democratic reforms. Merz argues that associate membership would bring Ukraine closer to the EU at once, "without prejudicing the ongoing accession negotiations." | Such a solution could also inject "new momentum" into the enlargement process as a whole. No European country has joined the EU since Croatia in 2013. The remaining Western Balkan states could benefit from this intermediate step too. | Con: You can't be a little bit pregnant | As everyone knows, you cannot be a little bit pregnant. Nor can you be a little bit of an EU member. Switzerland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland take part in the single market, but they have no say in its rules. And, crucially, these are countries with long and deeply rooted democratic traditions. Ukraine is not one of them. Its de-Sovietisation, right down to the roots, is far from complete. The accession process is therefore the best structural modernisation programme available to post-Soviet states like Ukraine. The reforms are often hard, but necessary. | Merz's proposal of "associate membership" ultimately offers Ukraine little that it is not already entitled to under the association agreement in force since 2017: personnel and financial support for reforms, and privileged access to the single market. | Flimsy, too, is Merz's notion that member states would commit, under associate membership, to extend the mutual-assistance clause of Article 42(7) of the EU Treaty to Ukraine. That is a hollow provision. And above all: it is not the EU but Ukraine—with the only battle-hardened army on the continent—that is holding Russian imperialism at bay, and thus defending Europe. | Oliver Grimm and Wolfgang Böhm, EU desk, Die Presse |
|
|
|
|
| | Zagreb · Croatia · Telegram.hr | How unresolved bilateral issues shape Croatia's stance toward EU enlargement | Generally speaking, Croatia's stance is clear. The Croatian Government and the main political parties support EU enlargement, fully aware of its strategic importance for Croatia's neighbourhood and the wider region of Southeast Europe. | This is backed by a relatively fresh experience—Croatia joined the EU just 13 years ago and to some extent still remembers how enlargement simplifies everyday life for ordinary citizens and families. However, looking closer at the political and social realities, things become more complicated. | The clearest example of this involves the unresolved bilateral issues. In the 2000s, Slovenia blocked Croatia’s EU accession talks over a border dispute. Once negotiations were finally completed in June 2011, the Croatian Parliament passed the Declaration on Promoting European Values. It explicitly stated that "open bilateral issues between states, such as border disputes, must not stall candidate countries on their path to the European Union (...)." | There are two main problems with this document. First, nobody remembers it any more. Second, if by some miracle someone does, the declaration carries zero legal weight—it binds no one, least of all the government. Furthermore, most of the open issues Croatia has with its neighbours stem from the 1990s Homeland War, making them deeply sensitive topics for the Croatian public. Therefore, it is certain that the Croatian authorities will seek to use the accession process to resolve some of these issues. | Confirmation of this followed quickly. Just ten days before the publication of this newsletter, the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs issued a statement emphasizing that resolving outstanding issues between Croatia and Montenegro is „essential for the completion of EU accession talks.“ | They urged Podgorica to engage in a "constructive dialogue and accelerate efforts to resolve all outstanding issues.“ The ministry laid out Croatia’s terms, which include „resolving the issue of compensation for former detainees of wartime detention camps; continuing efforts to locate the 14 persons still missing from the Homeland War; prosecuting war crimes (...)" | The Croatian government is unlikely to back down easily. Exactly how far Zagreb is ready to push will depend on the reaction of the EU —and whether the Croatian authorities will, at some point, face political pressure from Brussels or other member states. | Irena Frlan Gašparović, journalist, Telegram.hr |
|
|
|
|
| §03 · THE PODCAST | | Montenegro… and then, nothing for years | “For the first time since 2013, we are really counting down to the next enlargement—for Montenegro to become the 28th member state by 2028" | Antonio Costa, President of the European Council | |
|
|
| In this episode of the LENS EU podcast, we explore whether the European Union is ready to welcome new members and how the enlargement process is viewed from the perspective of different EU member states. | Our host, Paulina Pacuła, explains why, after years of stagnation, EU enlargement has returned to the centre of the European debate. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has transformed enlargement from what was primarily seen as a political and economic project into a key pillar of Europe's security. | Paulina also provides an overview of where each candidate country stands in the accession process—from Montenegro, now approaching the finish line, through North Macedonia, which has remained stuck in the waiting room for years, to Ukraine and Moldova, whose accession process has recently gathered unprecedented momentum. | Irena Frlan Gašparović and Jasmin Klarić from the Croatian news outlet Telegram explain why public support for enlargement in Croatia weakens once the discussion turns to specific candidate countries, particularly Serbia. They examine the impact of unresolved historical disputes, domestic politics and the debate over national veto powers on Croatia's position towards further enlargement. | Annija Vīnkalna from the Latvian news outlet TVNET presents a very different perspective. Latvia sees enlargement primarily as a geopolitical necessity and an investment in Europe's security. Riga consistently supports the accession of Ukraine, Moldova and Montenegro, viewing them as future partners that share Latvia's approach to foreign and security policy. | Finally, Paulina Pacuła looks at how the debate in Poland over Ukraine's EU membership is evolving, with security concerns increasingly giving way to disputes over agriculture, historical memory and domestic politics. |
| | | | | | |
| | |
|
