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| A weekly newsletter zooming in on Europe through local perspectives. Every Friday, one topic explored by five independent newsrooms. | | IN THIS ISSUE | §01 · In focus — Europe’s recovery experiment is ending. Did it work?
§02 · The local view — Berlin, Riga, Warsaw, Vienna and Zagreb
§03 · The podcast — Listen to the latest episode and join the conversation
§04 · From the newsrooms — Recent reporting from the lensEU network |
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| §01 · IN FOCUS | Europe’s recovery experiment is ending. Did it work? | At the end of September, one of the European Union’s biggest economic experiments quietly reached a crucial deadline. The RRF, based on EU joint borrowing, was meant not only to help Europe recover from the pandemic, but to make its economy greener, more digital and more resilient. Today we ask: did it deliver? | By 31 August, EU countries had to complete the milestones and targets attached to their national recovery plans. By 30 September, they had to submit their final payment requests. The European Commission now has until the end of December to make the remaining payments. After that, the Recovery and Resilience Facility – the centrepiece of the EU’s post-pandemic recovery programme – is effectively over. | What can we already say about its impacts? | The answer is frustratingly simple: not as much as we would like. Five years after the RRF was launched, separating its effects from everything else that happened to the European economy during that time – such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the energy crisis and the inflation shock that overlapped with its implementation – is exceptionally difficult. Just as quantifying the real economic and social impact of the reforms and investments. | In fact, a proper ex-post evaluation of the facility, as planned by the European Commission, is not due until 2028 – this is when we will have access to some hard data on the RRF real impact. | Still, the evidence available so far suggests that the RRF did provide a meaningful economic boost to the EU economy. A recent IMF study concludes that the additional spending stimulated demand, supported economic activity and jobs, with stronger effects in countries receiving larger allocations. The IMF estimates that the annual GDP effect on EU economies was at roughly 0,3-0,8%, depending on assumptions about implementation and spillovers between EU economies. | The European Commission’s own expectations were somewhat higher. Its modelling suggested that NextGenerationEU investments – around 90% of which came through the RRF – could leave EU GDP up to 1.4% higher in 2026 than it would have been without the programme. But this is not directly comparable with the IMF estimate: the Commission measured the level of GDP against a hypothetical Europe without NGEU, rather than the programme’s annual contribution to growth. | And there is a second reason to resist a premature verdict. Some of the experiment’s most important effects may not be visible yet. The RRF worked differently from traditional cohesion funds, where governments incur costs and subsequently seek reimbursement. Under the recovery facility, payments were triggered by fulfilling agreed milestones and targets. That means a country receiving 70 or 80%of its RRF allocation does not necessarily mean that an equivalent amount has already been spent in the real economy. | And that’s not all: building railways or electricity grids can boost demand immediately, but their effect on productivity emerges only once they are operating. Structural reforms may take even longer. The IMF therefore argues that a substantial part of the RRF’s growth impact could materialise only as investment is completed and its longer-term effects work through the economy. | However, there are already some eye-catching numbers that help explain why Brussels is keen to present the RRF as a success. | According to the European Commission, by mid-2026, around 35.5 million people had benefited from RRF-backed education and training measures, including 12.6 million young people. The money was apparently used to modernize classrooms for more than 4.1 million pupils and students – though apparently not enough of them in France, judging by the protests we are currently witnessing over exactly that issue. | The European Commission says that RRF investments had also increased the annual capacity of new or modernised healthcare facilities to more than 63 million patients. | The numbers become even bigger when we look at what national recovery plans are expected to deliver once all the investments are completed: around 17000 kilometres of new or upgraded railway infrastructure, some 13000 clean buses and around 60 GW of additional renewable generation capacity. According to the Commission, RRF-backed investments and reforms could eventually cut greenhouse-gas emissions by more than 100 million tonnes of CO₂ equivalent a year. | Does these numbers enough to prove RRF was a success? Not necessarily. | The RRF was supposed to do at least three things at once: | · it was an emergency response to an extraordinary economic shock; | · it was an investment programme designed to accelerate Europe’s green and digital transformation; | · it was an experiment in changing how EU money works: governments were paid for reaching agreed milestones and targets rather than simply reimbursed for eligible expenses. | On the first test, the evidence looks relatively encouraging. Europe’s recovery from the pandemic was remarkably fast. Economic studies generally find a positive growth effect from the RRF, particularly in countries that received larger allocations. And joint EU borrowing may itself have helped by reassuring financial markets at an extraordinarily uncertain moment. | The second and third tests are much harder. | Consider a railway financed by the RRF. We can count the kilometres of track and check whether the project was completed. But that does not tell us whether, ten years from now, businesses are more productive because goods move faster, whether commuters have better access to jobs or whether fewer people travel by car. | The same problem applies to reforms. A government can pass a law and fulfil a milestone. But did public administration actually become more efficient? Did healthcare become more resilient? Did workers acquire skills that improved their employment prospects? | This distinction between outputs and outcomes may ultimately be one of the most important lessons of the RRF. | And this is precisely where national experiences start to diverge. | Perhaps the most useful way to think about the RRF five years on is: we can count what Europe bought and built: trains, renewable capacity, renovated buildings, broadband connections, hospital equipment and thousands of reforms and milestones; we have increasingly convincing evidence that the money supported growth and investment. | But what we cannot yet know is whether it permanently made Europe more productive, more competitive and more resilient. | That verdict will take years. | Paulina Pacuła, EU reporter, OKO.press |
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| | | Berlin · Germany · CORRECTIV | The Recovery Fund and the Question of Joint Debt | The EU’s COVID-19 recovery fund, officially part of NextGenerationEU, played a role in Germany’s 2025 federal election. CORRECTIV’s fact-checking team looked into the issue, as misinformation often circulates around elections. | CORRECTIV’s fact-checking team examined a “decision-making guide” about the federal election that was circulating on social media. Around two dozen videos featuring a table circulated on TikTok, purportedly offering a neutral comparison of the positions of the CDU, SPD, AfD, Left Party, FDP and Greens – including on European debt policy. | In some cases, the table displayed the AfD logo or images of female AfD politicians. While the AfD’s positions were largely represented accurately, other parties were often attributed positions they did not hold. An example of disinformation during elections. | Regarding liability for other EU countries’ debts, the table falsely suggested that mainstream parties supported Germany taking responsibility for such debts. In fact, except for the Greens, whose position was not clearly defined, the parties examined rejected the idea that Germany should generally be liable for the debts of other EU member states. | The team investigated the claim that Germany would be liable for the debts of other EU member states in connection with the COVID-19 recovery fund. The situation is as follows: While EU treaties generally stipulate that member states are not liable for the debts of other countries, the EU itself took out loans on the financial markets to fund the recovery fund. Some experts cited by CORRECTIV therefore regard such EU funding as a form of joint borrowing. | Joint borrowing through the recovery fund is nothing new: the EU borrowed €750 billion for the fund to help address the economic and social consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. The SURE programme, which supported short-time work schemes, was also based on joint EU borrowing. | The fact-check therefore illustrates an important distinction. Joint EU borrowing does not automatically mean that Germany assumes legal liability for the existing national debts of other member states. The recovery fund was instead an example of the EU collectively raising debt to finance an agreed European programme. | Lilith Grull, CORRECTIV.Europe |
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| | Riga · Latvia · TVNET | Did the Recovery Fund really change Latvia? | For Latvia, the Recovery Fund became not just post-Covid support, but one of the main sources of investment before the programme’s implementation deadline on 31 August 2026. According to the European Commission, Latvia’s plan focuses on the green and digital transitions, energy efficiency, hospital modernisation, regional development, transport, and reforms in education and governance. Around 1.97 billion euros is available to Latvia for these purposes. | By May, Latvia had already received its fourth and penultimate payment, worth 371.2 million euros. The Ministry of Finance said the payment was made after 41 reform and investment indicators had been fulfilled. Overall, according to the European Commission, by 8 May Latvia had received 1.46 billion euros, or around three quarters of the total allocation. | The economic impact, however, is harder to assess clearly. The European Commission’s 2026 Country Report on Latvia says that in 2025 the economy returned to growth of 2.1%, while investment increased by 9.8%, partly thanks to public investment and EU-funded projects. But the same report also points to a limitation: after the RRF is phased out in 2027, its stimulus effect will begin to fade. | In Latvia, the Recovery Fund became less a major political symbol than a technical question: meeting all targets by the deadline in order not to lose money. The main question now is not only whether the fund helped recovery, but whether it will leave lasting changes behind - more energy-efficient homes, stronger hospitals, high-functioning digital services and projects that Latvia itself would probably not have been able to pay for so quickly. | Andrejs Timofejevs, TVNET GRUPA journalist |
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| | Warsaw · Poland · OKO.press | Poland’s RRF sprint: success or just catching up? | Poland started its recovery race almost two years late. Payments from its RRF plan were frozen during the rule-of-law dispute between the Law and Justice government and Brussels, leaving the country with an unusually short time to deploy one of the EU’s largest recovery packages. | The government nevertheless declares victory. By the end of September, Poland had submitted its ninth and final payment request, while more than one million contracts worth almost the entire 240 billion zlotys had been signed. The government estimates that RRF-financed investment has added around 1.5% to Polish GDP. | And there are tangible results: 583 kilometres of railway lines modernised or revitalised, 1908 buses and trams delivered, broadband brought to more than 540 000 homes and 465 000 households benefiting from cleaner heating, renewables or thermal renovation. | But Poland also illustrates the problem with declaring the RRF a success too early. Signing a contract is not the same as completing an investment, and the government itself acknowledges that some projects are only now beginning. | The rush also exposed problems with oversight. In 2025, controversy erupted over grants for businesses in the hospitality and tourism sector, including projects involving yachts, saunas and an online bridge courses. The government suspended further payments and launched additional checks, illustrating the administrative challenge of deploying such enormous sums at extraordinary speed. The topic was widely used by opposition parties to attack the government. | The real Polish test is therefore still ahead: did the spending sprint merely boost investment temporarily, or will it leave behind a more productive, competitive and energy-secure economy? | Paulina Pacuła, EU reporter, OKO.press |
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| | Vienna · Austria · Die Presse | “Well-intentioned, but poorly implemented”: the EU Covid Recovery Fund | Following last summer’s record-breaking heatwave across the EU, one can only support the idea: renovate, renovate, renovate, so that our houses and flats are better insulated and thus more resistant to both heat and cold. What could be more obvious than using the largest fund since the EU’s foundation for this very purpose? | That was the idea five years ago, too, when the EU’s COVID Recovery Fund was established. Since then, Member States have been allowed to use 43 billion euros from it for measures to improve the energy efficiency of residential buildings. | The European Court of Auditors has had a closer look at how these funds have been used and published its special report on the matter. It can only be described as damning. In most cases, “quicker and simpler renovations were favoured”. In other words: solar panels were hastily installed on roofs and new windows fitted, rather than funding more comprehensive but economically more viable long-term refurbishments. “In other words: the money is often spent quickly rather than in a strategically sound manner,” the auditors note. | They warn that the EU has thereby subsidised a twofold problem. Firstly, the buildings renovated in a slapdash manner will remain “stuck in a lower energy efficiency class for years”. This makes future, genuine improvements even more expensive. Secondly, investments were apparently promoted that “do not result in any reduction in emissions in the long term”. | “The way I see it: well-intentioned, but poorly implemented,” is the verdict of Austrian MEP Evelyn Regner (SPÖ) on the Recovery Fund. “Much of it has been invested in a very unimaginative way, following the ‘scattergun’ approach.” Her party colleague Andreas Schieder agrees: “It was the right idea at the right time. But eventually, you can see Europe’s structural weaknesses. The money then often flows into existing projects run by favourites.” | The European Commission, which designed the recovery fund with the appealing name ‘Next Generation EU’, does not dispute this criticism. The relevant regulation did not stipulate any obligation for more extensive renovations, and in any case, Covid, the energy price crisis and the Russian invasion of Ukraine have delayed many complex construction projects. | In any case, the Commission has taken a liking to the principle of creating a large fund that allocates lump sums to Member States – and so have the national governments. The draft for the next financial framework covering the years 2028 to 2034 continues this principle of the recovery fund. | Oliver Grimm, EU correspondent, Die Presse |
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| | Zagreb · Croatia · Telegram.hr | RRF in Croatia: The story of a lost opportunity | In April 2021, during discussions on how Croatia would invest billions from the EU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), two transformative projects were frequently mentioned by the ruling party. The first was the construction of a biorefinery in Sisak. The second was the development of level-five autonomous vehicles integrated into Zagreb's public transport system. | These two projects "fully affirm the green and digital agenda," stated Tomislav Ćorić, the Minister of Economy and Sustainable Development at the time. Five years later, the RRF has just reached its finish line. But the biorefinery has not: last year, the Government removed it from the list of RRF investments. As for the robotaxis, we still do not know what will happen. | These are neither the only nor the most important projects Croatia was supposed to realize with RRF funds. However, they illustrate how the Government's ambitions have dwindled. Sometimes this was due to objective circumstance like short deadlines. | Sometimes, however, it was due to a lack of political will. Croatia has a notoriously large number of municipalities (428), many of which lack administrative and financial capacity. Instead of abolishing them, the reform was reduced to a so-called functional merger—where two or more municipalities jointly perform certain tasks. Yet, even this occasionally turned into a farce: more than 30 years ago, the author of this text took a school bus to high school that is today de facto presented as a functional merger. | However, the Government is satisfied. They say that Croatia is among the top member states in implementing the RRF and that this mechanism has played a vital role in transforming the Croatian economy and society, from public administration and healthcare to strengthening energy resilience and economic competitiveness. Whether this optimism is justified is something we will find out in the event of a new crisis. | Irena Frlan Gašparović, journalist, Telegram.hr |
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| §03 · THE PODCAST | | Five Years of Europe’s Recovery Fund | “If I spend 0.6% of GDP every year, I expect at least as much in terms of growth. Hopefully a little bit more.” | Cinzia Alcidi, Head of Economic Policy/Jobs and Skills Unit, Centre for European Policy Studies. | |
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| In this episode of LensEU, host Paulina Pacuła of OKO.press, the lead newsroom for this edition, looks back at one of the European Union’s most ambitious economic experiments: the €750 billion NextGenerationEU recovery programme and its central instrument, the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). | Five years after the pandemic, the episode asks a simple but difficult question: did it work? Croatia offers a critical case study, with Telegram journalist Irena Frlan Gašparović arguing that despite massive EU support, many of the structural weaknesses the money was supposed to address remain unresolved. Other countries, including Spain, Portugal, Greece and Poland, show more positive economic results. | The main guest, economist Cinzia Alcidi of the Centre for European Policy Studies, explains why the RRF’s impact is difficult to measure. Its implementation coincided with the war in Ukraine, the energy crisis and high inflation, making it hard to isolate the fund’s effects. | The conversation also explores green and digital investments, the shift from reimbursing costs to paying for results, and the political controversy surrounding common EU borrowing. Finally, it asks whether the RRF’s most important legacy may be the way it changes how the EU finances future investment. |
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