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| A weekly newsletter zooming in on Europe through local perspectives. Every Friday, one topic explored by five independent newsrooms. | | IN THIS ISSUE | §01 · In focus — Europe Votes for Change — But What Comes Next?
§02 · The local view — Berlin, Riga, Warsaw, Vienna and Zagreb
§03 · The podcast — Listen to the latest episode and join the conversation
§04 · From the newsrooms — Recent reporting from the lensEU network |
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| §01 · IN FOCUS | A Warning to Europe: What Andris Kulbergs's Victory in Latvia Reveals About Populism | Latvia has voted for a politician promising results instead of endless talk. The danger begins when a leader sees not just red tape but also the people and institutions meant to hold him accountable as obstacles. That is the question now facing Andris Kulbergs – and Europe. | In the 3 October parliamentary election, Kulbergs's United List (AS) won 35.3% of the vote and 41 of the 100 seats in parliament – a post-independence record for a single party or alliance. Turnout was a record-low 51.8%. Latvia's president has asked the prime minister to begin forming a new government. | After just four months as prime minister, Kulbergs had no long-term record in government to offer. Voters saw pace, demands for accountability and a leader focused on results. Their verdict was less a reward for achievements than a bet that he could put Latvia right. | Writing him off as a slick campaign creation would be lazy. Before entering politics, Kulbergs restructured a car dealership during the financial crisis. By his account, staffing fell from 378 to 120 and an €8 million loss became a €400,000 profit. These weren't PowerPoint promises: people lost their jobs. In office, he applies the same crisis-management formula: problem, person responsible, deadline, result. The method has force, but also a price. An airBaltic restructuring he supports could affect 500–700 jobs across the Baltics. | Kulbergs also turned his management style into a campaign pitch: 79% of government priorities completed. The arithmetic was accurate – 48 of 61 measures it had set itself – but that does not mean 79% of Latvia's problems were solved. One number, one message: we deliver. The machinery behind the new-looking offer, however, is old. | Founded in 2022, United List combines three older parties: the Latvian Greens, the Latvian Association of Regions and the Liepāja Party. All have established municipal networks and business ties. Their parliamentary representation has almost tripled since 2022. Those networks have not disappeared; they have acquired a powerful new figurehead. Kulbergs once needed United List. Now it needs him more. | The alliance's manifesto puts it bluntly: "Then came the solution – Andris Kulbergs." Not a better system. A single man. Such personalisation can develop into a cult of personality, with the leader placed above party, institutions, even country – his will dressed up as the national interest. Yet behind him are the alliance's old political and business power brokers. Will he resist them when their interests clash with the country's? Or will his mandate give them greater power to pursue their own? | An August investigation by De facto, on Latvian public television, illustrated how these interests overlap. United List's office and Liepāja Party leader Uldis Sesks helped organise an official ministerial visit to western Latvia. The itinerary included businesses linked to alliance figures; party candidates in campaign T-shirts accompanied Kulbergs at a market. The anti-corruption agency opened an inquiry – not proof of wrongdoing. But the line between official duty and campaigning was blurred. Public office must not become a party campaign tool. | Where does populism enter the picture? Not in those business ties, but in Kulbergs's political story. Competence does not rule out populist rhetoric. On one side are the "doers", supposedly acting for ordinary people; on the other, those who merely talk and obstruct. Once a leader presents his own policies as the people's will, critics become obstacles rather than voices to be answered. | Consider his claim that a single government–NGO council meeting cost €18,000 for "sitting around". The figure came from dividing an annual contract's value by the number of meetings, ignoring other work covered by the contract. It produced a misleading tale of NGO waste. Kulbergs praised the Employers' Confederation of Latvia, where he once served on the council, as a model – although it too receives public and EU funding for advocacy. One group's funding becomes waste; another's is perfectly respectable. | He has also proposed a non-binding referendum on the Istanbul Convention, which addresses violence against women and domestic violence, to establish "what Latvian society wants". But majority opinion alone cannot settle international obligations or human-rights protections. Politicians must still make and defend those decisions. | His next test is coalition-building. Kulbergs says there will be "no room for major compromises". If he means ending the trade in government jobs, good. But if challenges from coalition partners, NGOs or journalists become unacceptable obstacles, that is another matter. | Elsewhere in Europe, the consequences of weakening checks on power are plain. Poland's Law and Justice reshaped the courts and public media; the legacy remains. Viktor Orbán lost Hungary's 2026 election after 16 years, but the system he built did not vanish overnight. In Slovakia, decisions by Robert Fico's government on public media and NGOs have sparked disputes over their independence. Kulbergs is not Latvia's Orbán or Fico yet; the evidence does not justify that comparison. Europe shows what separates a strong country from a country with a strong leader: strong institutions outlast even powerful politicians. Weaken them, and the consequences of a leader's rule may outlast the leader himself. | Latvia is no crystal ball for Europe's elections. It is a warning about a political logic that can travel. France votes for a president and Poland for a parliament in 2027. Promises to "get things done" may resonate there too. The question is what candidates will do when courts, the press or watchdogs say no. | Latvia faces that test now. Kulbergs may deliver reforms others have failed to make. But a country is not a company, and its prime minister does not own it. Election victories and completed tasks can be counted. His political legacy will be measured by whether he leaves Latvia itself stronger. | Toms Ostrovskis TVNET GRUPA Editor-in-Chief |
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| | | Berlin · Germany · CORRECTIV | The AfD in Saxony-Anhalt: What happens after the election victory? | With 43.8 per cent of the vote, the AfD has won the state election in Saxony-Anhalt. Particularly surprising is how many people who had previously not voted the party managed to persuade. Around 170,000 people who had not voted in the previous election cast their ballots for the AfD this time. | One reason for its success is that traditional ties to parties such as the CDU and SPD are weakening. The AfD can present itself as an alternative to the established political system and make sweeping promises without yet having had to demonstrate at state or federal level how it would deliver on them. | Attention is now turning to the formation of a government. AfD lead candidate Ulrich Siegmund is expected to seek election as Minister-President in December. However, with 39 seats, his party does not have an outright majority. He would therefore need votes from other parliamentary groups. | An AfD-led state government could bring changes, particularly to domestic and education policy and the work of the domestic intelligence service. Foreign policy, by contrast, is decided primarily at federal or EU level, leaving a state government little room for manoeuvre in this area. | The key question will be which of the AfD’s proposals it can actually implement – and where it will depend on support from other parties. | The AfD advocates nationalist and anti-immigration positions. Since 2023, the domestic intelligence service in Saxony-Anhalt has classified the party’s state branch as a “confirmed right-wing extremist organisation”, on the grounds that it threatens fundamental principles of Germany’s free democratic constitutional order. | Lena Köpsell, AfD Beat Reporter, CORRECTIV |
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| | Riga · Latvia · TVNET | Latvia Wants Results. But at What Cost? | The parliamentary election on 3 October showed just how tired Latvian voters have grown of politics as usual. Prime Minister Andris Kulbergs's United List won 35.3% of the vote and 41 seats in the Saeima. Another 32 seats went to two populist forces - Latvia First and Sovereign Power/Union of New Latvians. Meanwhile, voter turnout was just 51.8%. | Kulbergs had been prime minister for just over four months, but he managed to convince voters that he could take action where others had spent years merely discussing problems. His government reported completing 79% of its priority tasks. Yet ticking items off a government checklist does not necessarily mean solving the country's problems. | But where does effective governance end and populism begin? Criticism of funding for non-governmental organisations, blurred boundaries between official government activities and election campaigning, and the portrayal of political opponents as obstacles standing in the way of "people who get things done" - all raise questions about how strong the institutions responsible for holding those in power accountable will remain. | The experience of other European countries shows just how differently political change can unfold. In Germany, the far-right AfD achieved an impressive result in the state of Saxony-Anhalt but failed to secure a majority. In Austria, the Freedom Party continues to gain popularity while remaining in opposition. In Croatia, by contrast, the populist Homeland Movement entered government only to see its support plummet. | For Latvia, the real test is only beginning. Can Kulbergs deliver the reforms he has promised while preserving the independence of the country's institutions? | Andrejs Timofejevs, TVNET GRUPA journalist |
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| | Warsaw · Poland · OKO.press | Poland: A Destructive Standoff Between the Government and the President | Poland’s 2025 presidential election resulted in a victory for Karol Nawrocki. Nawrocki was the candidate of Law and Justice (PiS), a right-wing populist party that governed the country from 2015 to 2023. During his campaign, he leaned heavily on nationalist rhetoric, allowing him to consolidate support among right-wing voters. | Polish politics is mired in an institutional standoff between, on the one hand, the coalition government led by pro-European Prime Minister Donald Tusk and, on the other, a president who looks to the American right for inspiration. | Although Poland is a parliamentary republic in which the prime minister wields greater power, the presidency is far from purely ceremonial: the president has the power to veto legislation passed by parliament. Nawrocki has made extensive use of this power on an unprecedented scale — since taking office, he has already vetoed 42 bills. | The conflict, fuelled by extreme political polarisation, makes it difficult to pursue a coherent state policy. One example is Nawrocki’s veto of legislation implementing the European SAFE instrument (Security Action for Europe), which provides EU member states with long-term loans for defence investment. The government has found an alternative way to get the programme off the ground, but the dispute illustrates how no policy area — not even defence — is any longer immune to bitter political conflict. | With Russia posing a persistent threat, polarisation is becoming a problem for Poland that directly affects the country’s national security. | Bartosz Kocejko-Szukalski, deputy editor-in-chief, OKO.press |
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| | Vienna · Austria · Die Presse | Austria: Where is politics heading? | Almost to the day two years ago, it was election day here in Austria. And for the first time in the history of the so-called Second Republic – that is, since 1945 – the far-right Freedom Party, the FPÖ, won the most votes: around 29 percent. Yet it is not in government. After long negotiations, the conservative People's Party, the ÖVP, the Social Democrats of the SPÖ and the liberal Neos joined forces – forming the first three-party coalition at the federal level since the postwar years. | The plan was to keep the FPÖ small through good governance. So far, it hasn't worked. If we voted next Sunday, support for the Freedom Party – the “Blues”, as they are called here – would be even higher. In the polls, the FPÖ stands at close to 40 percent, the People's Party at around 19 and the Social Democrats at around 13 percent. That means the government would currently no longer have a majority. And FPÖ leader Herbert Kickl is clearly ahead when people are asked whom they want as chancellor. | Is this just frustration with the government? There is good reason to think it runs deeper. The FPÖ has long been rooted in milieus that used to vote Social Democrat. In the last election, around half of all blue-collar workers voted for it. | What is driving this trend? Mostly domestic issues: the high inflation of recent years, a weak economy, a strict austerity course. Add to that a government that often looks more like a marriage of convenience than a shared project. | What does this mean for Europe? As long as the current government holds, Austria remains a reliable partner. It backs the sanctions against Russia and supports Ukraine – not militarily, because of its neutrality, but politically and financially. Chancellor Christian Stocker now says openly: neutrality alone does not protect Austria. | With Kickl as chancellor, this would change. The FPÖ calls aid to Ukraine a breach of neutrality, it is sceptical of EU enlargement, and in 2016 it signed a friendship agreement with Vladimir Putin's party. Austria could then play a role in Brussels similar to the one Hungary played under Viktor Orbán for years. | The next regular national election is not due until 2029. It remains to be seen whether the coalition lasts that long. | Anna Wallner, Head of New Media, “Die Presse” |
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| | Zagreb · Croatia · Telegram.hr | Dramatic shifts are happening elsewhere | Political change in Croatia comes in small doses. Since the fall of communism, a single right-wing party that prefers to describe itself as center-right—the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)—has governed for a full 28 years. On the two occasions HDZ lost power, the government was led by the Social Democrats (Social Democratic Party, or SDP). HDZ and SDP consistently command at least 50 percent of the electorate's support, a reality that holds true today even as the world changes dramatically. | That does not mean change is entirely absent, however. The most significant shift began two years ago when the Minister of Health was arrested on charges of conspiring with organized crime to sell overpriced medical equipment to Croatian hospitals. Since that moment, HDZ, which has led the country under Prime Minister Andrej Plenković since 2016, has been losing ground. | While the party remains the single strongest political force in opinion polls, the combined rating of two left-wing parties—SDP and Možemo! (Green-Left)—surpasses that of HDZ, with the gap steadily widening over time. SDP and Možemo! are expected to sign a coalition agreement this month for the 2028 parliamentary elections. | Polls also show growth for Most, a populist right-wing party advocating for greater national sovereignty within the EU and a tougher stance on migration. However, the rise in their support from just over 6 percent last year to slightly above 9 percent today is hardly cause for dramatic headlines. | In short, current indicators in Croatia point to a potential change of government in 2028. However, dramatic shifts on today's key EU issues remain highly unlikely. | Jasmin Klarić, journalist, Telegram |
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| §03 · THE PODCAST | Europe Votes for Change — But What Comes Next? | "Voters can easily ask: 'What are you promising me now? You were in power before, and you did not do it. So why should I believe you this time?'" | Lelde Metla-Rozentāle, Political scientist of Rīga Stradiņš University | |
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| Europe is voting for change, but what happens when voters turn away from established political parties? Latvia's 2026 parliamentary election delivered a landslide victory for the pro-European United List, while populist parties also made significant gains. Meanwhile, in Germany, Austria and Croatia, the rise of far-right parties reveals different paths for political change - from winning new voters to entering government and losing support. | In this episode of lensEU, journalists from Latvia's TVNET, Germany's CORRECTIV, Austria's Die Presse and Croatia's Telegram explore why traditional political loyalties are weakening, what drives voters towards alternative parties, and whether promises of change can survive the realities of governing. |
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